We propose two new evolutionary rules that is not mimic evolution of strategies based on the spatial Prisoner's Dilemma (PD). The former follows the selfish evolutionary rule and then the coexistence phase appears with weak phase transition with mutations. The second rule is that of globally coupled spatial PD where the strategy of an agent is taken so that the total payoff of the whole system increases. Then it is natulally suspected that all agents will become cooperators in general. We, however, find that situations is rather complerx. We find two critical points within the usual conditions in the parameters included the payoff matrix in the PD. Further as we break the condition without losing PD condition, we meet two more essential curitical points. We discuss the areas between these critical points in the parameter space and uncover the various properties by simulating on computer. We show that in some parameter regions, strange properties, that is, like chaotic behaveor appear and the coexistence between defectors and cooperators appears in the large parameter region. Thus we point out that usual non-essential condition among the parameters in the payoff matrix imposed on the PD privent from recovering rich structures in the evolutionally spatial PS.
Introduction
Traditionally differential equations have been applied to understand various phenomena in the nature and the artificial, especially physical, phenomena, since they were used to construct classical dynamics by I. Newton. It, however, seems that some phenomena are rather relevant to be studied as they follow some descrete dynamics.
They may include biological, social, ecological phenomena and so on, which have a close relationship to "information". The game theory among many aproaches give one of interesting view of them. In this article we discuss the Prisoner's Dilemma game (PD), which is the most famous game and has substantial content among many sorts of games.
PD is symmetric game played by two agents and the payoff function acquired in each strategy is discribed by matrix form. One shot game of PD can be analyzed analytically [1] . Many researches have been made to resolve the Dilemma, pareto optimal = N ash equilibrium, and how can we obtain cooperation rationally.
Based on PD, iterated games have been studied and Axelrod [2] has shown that cooperation can emerge as a norm in a society comprised of individuals with selfish motives. Moreover spatial version of PG has been discussed so that a defection is to be only evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) [5] if each agent interacts with any other agent. This aspect drastically changes if a spatial structure of the population is considered. If the interaction between agents is locally restricted to their neighbors [3] , a stable coexistence between cooperators and defectors become possible under certain conditions [3] [4] . In the case, one agent plays PD with their neighbors and in next step the agent take the same strategy of the agent that acquired hightest payoff among the neighbors, which reflects to Dawin's theory, sometimes "including mutation" [6] . Then it is assumed that all agents play at same time and follow the same way. Recently the evolution of the spatio-structured PD has been systematically explored in details in Ref. [7] .
We here discuss two other evolutionary rules within the framework of the spatio-structured PD where agents interact locally, in which the evolutionary rule entices the cooperator and defector to coexistence phase.
One way to realize it is to change his(her) strategy when the agent would get more payoff if he(she) had changed the strategy. This selfish rule, however, leads to a trivial result, since PD has a dominant strategy. Second one is to change the strategy like totalitarian, that is, if the total payoff yielded in whole system increases when an agent changes the strategy. We call this evolutionary rule the grobally coupled evolution. This evolutionary role is expected to lead to full cooperative strategy but it do not so. We found 4 critical points analytically, and perform computer simulations in the parameter regions bounded on the critical points.
After Introduction, section 1, we discuss our evolutionary strategy and the critical points analytically in the section 2. In the section 3 simulation results are obtained based on the results in the section 2. The final section 4 is devoted to summary.
Evolutionary Rule and Analytical Study
Spationally structured PD is first explained briefly. Then we discuss two evolutionary rules that are not considered thus far and study them analytically.
Spational Structured PD as Cellular Automaton
Two types of agents, cooperators (C) and defectors (D) are considered. The distinction is made by means of a variable θ ∈ {−1, 1}, where 1 refers to cooperation and −1 refers to defection. An individual agent i is indicated by θ i . N is total number of agents and the fraction of cooperators and defectors are given by
The spatial distribution of the agents are considered as a two dimensional cellular automaton (CA) consisting of N = n 2 cells, where each cell is identified by the index i ∈ N refering its spacial position and the state θ i sits on the cell. The state space of all possible configurations is of the order 2 N .
We asumme that each agent i has two options, C (θ = 1) or D (θ = −1). Playing with 4 neighbors of i, the action chosen by i and actions chosen by the 4 agents only affect the total payoff (Hamiltonian). We assume that an agent i simultaneously plays with 4 agents with a same strategy, and so the game essentially reduces to 2-person game. Then the two person game can be described by a payoff matrix and it is obtained by the following Table 1 for PD. 
In PD, the payoffs have to fulfill the following condition:
and usually for iteration of game an additional conndition is imposed:
The second condition, however, is considered to have not any essential meaning for the structured spatial game. Later the breakdown of this condition (4) induces some interesting phenomena in spatio PD. A simple analysis show that strategy D is so-colled ESS in a one-shot PD [5] . It is also known that the pareto optimal strategy is for both agents to take C but Nash solution is for both agents to take D, which leads to famous "Dilemma".
In this paper we are interseted in the spacial effects of PD and assume that each agent interects only with the 4 agents of its neighborhood. In evolutionary game theory this is called a 4-person game. We here investigate the modified evolutionary rules, where players do not mimic the best strategy in its neighbors. We consider two extreme ways, one obeys a selfish evolutionary rule and another is like totalitarian, where explict values of T, S, R, P play important role apart from the usual PD.
Selfish Evolution
Selfish evolution is to change strategy taken by an agent if the (target) agent get more payoff when he(she) changes the strategy, independent of other agents. Suppose that all the agents follow this rule and each agent updates its strategy in regular order. We see this case leads to a trivial result.
In the simulation experiment of sec. 3 we include mutant agents with some probability with respect to Bolzmann distribution among regular agents that obey the selfish rule. This type agents will lead to the coexistence phase between C and D agents.
Globally Coupled Evolution
As the second evolutionary model, we consider that if the total payoff, hamiltonian, yielded in whole system increases when an agent changes the strategy, the agent assumes to change its strategy. So an agents decide its strategy according to the total payoff of the whole system. Due to this property, we call this model "globally coupled". Notice that the evolution of the system depends on from which agent the strategy is renewed at each round, since by changing a strategy of each agent the Hamiltonian generally is updated and the next target agent decides its strategy based on the updated Hamiltonian. It means that the order of agent targeted is important and the evolutionary process is only determinstic under a order. We mainly discuss the case of the following ordering;
in Mathematica notation, where (i, j) shows the coordinate (row element, colum element) in latice like CA. A random ordering will be also considered latterly .
Analytic study and critical points
We analytically investigate globally coupled evolution of PD in this subsection. Let consider the profit P i (C) that a cooperator agent i encircled by c cooperators and d defectors;
If the agent change the strategy from C to D, the updated profit P i (D) of the agent is given by
and the difference is
because of the equation (3) . Noticing that the increment δh(θ j ) of the profit of a neiborhood j of the agent i brought by this change is
the total δh(θ j ) resulted by 4 neighbors (c cooperators and d defectors) is given by
This reverse of the strategy of agent i reflects the total profit (Hamiltonian) of the whole system and thus the resultant increment of the total Hamiltonian ∆H iC [c, d] is given by
where the first term in the right hand side is negative if the equation (4) is satisfied. In contrast with this when the agent i change the strategy from D to C, the corresponding amount becomes
by following the similar calculation. Explicitly they are written by
where (14) is negative by definition of PD, and (15) and (16) are negative because of the additional condition (4). Whether (12) and (13) are positive or not depends on the explicit parameters even when satisfying (3) and (4). This point is differnt from usual analysis of PD where explict values of P, R, S, T are not essential but the order of the magunitudes plays only important role. A standard set of parameters adopted by Okada [1] is {P, R, S, T } = {−3, 5, −4, 6} and then all increments of the Hamiltonianturn are negative.
However, whenever the condition 2P < S + T is satisfied, ∆H[0, 4] and ∆H [1, 3] come to be positive, and moreover (15) and (16) become possible to be positive when the the aditional condotion (4) is broken.
To explain this situation, without losing the generality we can choose S and T as variable parameters while Though the lattice size n = 13 seems to be too small, we have ascertained that essential results are unchanged by magnifying the lattice size except for some cases pointed specially. While states immediately converge in almost every case, some interesting cases show rather complex behaviors such as chaotic-like behaviors.
Selfish Evolution
As all the agents follow this rule, full agents become defectors in the second step (i.e. after one round) because the dominant strategy in PD is a defection. Simulation results of course supports this argument.
This situation is unchanged even in introducing a stohastic process by the Metropolis method with Boltzmann distribution, where player i evade the above evolutionary rule with the probability 1 − e −qδPi , at low tempertature. (q is inverse of temperature.) At high tempertature, however, a coexistence phase between cooperators and defectors appears. The critical value is q = 1.0 ∼ 2.0, that is, when q > 2 the system is covered to defecrors after a few steps. Between q = 1.0 and q = 2.0 the system is unstable, and all defectors age and the age with a few cooperators revolve. As q decrease from 1.0 to 0, the average of the population of cooperators slowly increases to the half of total population with some fructuation. A typical example with q = 0.2 is given in the Fig. 2 .
These results also do not depend on the initial state of the system, starting even from full defection (cooperation) initially. However this convergence is so unstable that the state does not converge even when initial state has two C-agents. Interestingly N 1 is exactly periodic and during the periodic age the total Hamiltoniani invariant, while the states itself is changing.
Globally Coupled Evolution
Random initial states with p = 0.5 also expose almost convergent behaviour in N 1 but they are exactly periodic really (Fig.5) . The period is scale dependent.
Generally various types of periodic behaviours in N 1 appear in random initial configurations but the configurations of the state never converge and so are not periodic (of course strictly speaking, it is periodic because the dimension of the configuration space in size n is 2 N ). (Fig.8) , while the configurations show hightly geometrical patterns.
For n = 13 the period is 23 ± 1 (essentially 2(n − 1)) when states initially begin with (a),(b),(c),(d) and the total Hamiltonian remains invariant during the period. On the other hand, begining with randam initial state, the evolution of the state is primafacie chaotic (Fig.9) . However, constructing the returm map, we can find a weak correlation in N 1 data (the Fig.10 ). It is conjectured that the initial randamnes only weakly breaks the above periodic property.
(v)Region C (standard region)
In this case we have all ∆H < 0. As a typical value of S and T , S = −4 and T = 6 are taken. As expected, the state rapidly converges to the state with all C, independent of initial configuration states. D agents, when the number of initial C agents decreases, there should be some kind of phase transition. We study this by varying the initial ratio f 1 , that is to say, the parameter p. They are summarized in the figure 11. Around p = 0.2, we find that a weak phase transition occurs.
Some Remarks
In the selfish evolution model without mutants, the state trivially comes to be full D-agent domitated world.
In the case with mutants, however, there is a coextence phase between D and C. As varying the mutation ratio q, a sort of phase transition appears at around q = 1.5 ± 0.5. When q < 1.0, it is inferred that the population ratio N 1 /N −1 is correlated with q, that is, the degree of randamness, from the simulation results, and thus the results may be almost consequential one.
In the globally coupled model, any interesting phenomena do not arise at critical points related to ∆H [1, 3] and ∆H [0, 4] , while rich structures appear at critical points related to ∆H [3, 1] and ∆H [4, 0] which emerges at the regions breaking the condition (4) . There are the coexistence phase in the latter regions, widely.
This can be understood by considering the reduced payoff table which is constructed by adding the payoffs of two agents at each element of the payoff table 1. This can be also derived by noticing that S and T always appears pairwise and P and R always appears as multiples of 2 in ∆H's. The reduced table for PD is obtained in the Table 2 . Basically agents tend to be a C-agent in the globally coupled rule (that is, (C,C) is favored) with the total payoff 2R from the table 2. This tendency is broken at 2R < T + S and the agents' preference is changed to the strategy D from C. This cosideration give the two effective critical points related to ∆H [3, 1] and ∆H [4, 0] . On the other hand, S + T < 2P is irrelevant to the change of the tendency. Thus the critical points related to ∆H [1, 3] and ∆H[0, 4] do not contribute to this story drastically. 
To eliminate the order dependence of a target agent, we choose target agent at random to perform the same simulation. It, however, turns that the results are unaffected by the order essentially. The longer period is merely needed untill the state converges. But, almost chaotic behabiour that does not show any regular behavior in the 2 and 3 dimensional embedding space appears in the region B with random initial state, which should be analyzed in details.
Summary
In this article we propose two new evolutionary rules in which the explicit values in the payoff table play important roles apart from usual games. By these we mainly investigate the evolution of the spatio PD.
In the selfish evolutionary role with mutations, coexistence phase appears with weak phase transition where the order parameter is p. This may be almost understood trivially.
In the globally coupled rule it is natural to expect that a full D agent world is realized. As not expected, the rule presents rich structures in the spatio evolutionary PD. Analytically we find four critical points. When the condition S + T < 2R usually imposed is broken that is related two critical points, the coexistence phase appears in the wide range of parameter space, while the other two critical points do not any special role in the evolution (as expected all C world is generally generated), except for region E. The region E shows a little strange feature where there is a transition between all C world and all D world.
Thus we uncover the entire phase structures under these rules. Detail analysis for some commplex data in N 1 such as chaotic behavior remain to us. 
